The impact of New Public Management on efficiency : an analysis of Madrid’s hospitals. by Alonso Alonso, José Manuel et al.
Page 2 of 24
Ac
ce
pt
ed
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
2
The impact of New Public Management on efficiency: an analysis of Madrid’s
hospitals
Abstract
Madrid has recently become the site of one the most controversial cases of public 
healthcare reform in the European Union. Despite the fact that the introduction of New 
Public Management (NPM) into Madrid hospitals has been vigorous, little scholarship has 
been done to test whether NPM actually led to technical efficiency. This paper is one of the 
first attempts to do so. We deploy a bootstrapped Data Envelopment Analysis to compare 
efficiency scores in traditionally managed hospitals and those operating with new 
management formulas. We do not find evidence that NPM hospitals are more efficient than 
traditionally managed ones. Moreover, our results suggest that what actually matters may 
be the management itself, rather than the management model. 
Keywords: Healthcare reform, efficiency, New Public Management, Madrid.
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1. Introduction
New Public Management (NPM) policies have been introduced into public healthcare 
across most OECD countries from the 1980s, in response to concerns about rising 
healthcare expenditures, fuelled by technological and medical advances in treatment, as 
well as an aging population [1,2]. In Spain, NPM reforms were first introduced into the 
healthcare system from the early 1980s, in parallel with political decentralization1.
Decentralization allowed Spain´s 17 regional governments to gain autonomy as regards 
decisions to introduce or reinforce NPM into healthcare, including the adaptation of new 
hospital management models, such as different forms of Public Private Partnership (PPP)
[3]. Since then, regional governments in Spain have increasingly introduced NPM reforms 
into healthcare, particularly in Catalonia and Madrid [4]. However, vigorous NPM-related 
reform of the Madrid healthcare system has been highly controversial.
This paper focuses on the reform of hospitals belonging to the Madrid Regional 
Health Service (henceforth, SERMAS). Emulating healthcare reforms in the UK, Madrid 
vigorously implemented the use of new hospital management formulas, through the 
implementation of purchaser/provider split, use of PPPs, contracting out and the 
introduction of competition between hospitals. Moreover, reforms in Madrid gained 
increased traction during the ongoing economic and financial crises. Nevertheless, the 
implementation of healthcare reform has proved controversial and witnessed widespread 
protest by citizens and healthcare professionals. In particular, the attempt to contract out 
clinical services delivery in six public hospitals sparked popular criticism [5]. A popular 
movement formed by doctors, nursing staff and citizens — the so-called “white tide” —
took the streets in Madrid several times from November 2012. Despite this massive popular 
opposition, the contracting out bidding process went ahead. However, in January 2014, the 
regional government abruptly declared it would halt the contracting out plan, soon after the 
Madrid High Court suspended the process [6].
                                                          
1 Decentralization took place during the 1980s and 1990s, transferring powers in healthcare management 
gradually across the different Spanish regions, firstly to Catalonia (1981), Andalusia (1984), the Basque 
Country and Valencia (1987), Galicia and Navarra (1990) and the Canary Islands (1993). The healthcare 
decentralization process ended in January 2002, when the devolution of autonomy and power from the central 
government to all regional governments was completed [3].
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Policy-makers and scholars have argued that NPM techniques would increase 
efficiency in the health care sector, by introducing criteria from private sector management 
into traditional methods of public administration [7]. In the Spanish context, policymakers 
have used repeatedly the efficiency improvement argument to introduce new management 
formulas in healthcare delivery [8].
Theory suggests that NPM-related policies may enhance the efficiency of public 
service delivery, such as healthcare provision (for a comprehensive overview of NPM and 
efficiency, see [9]). However, the benefits of NPM-related tools in healthcare delivery have 
been already questioned from an international perspective (see, for example, [10-13].
Moreover, there is no clear evidence supporting efficiency gains as regards the use of new 
management formulas in Spain2, which is adding fuel to an already heated debate in 
relation to the pros and cons of introducing new management formulas in public hospitals. 
The central aim of this paper is to evaluate whether the NPM reforms implemented 
in the SERMAS hospitals’ network are indeed associated with efficiency gains. To do so, 
this paper carries out a comparative analysis of the performance of traditionally managed 
hospitals and those adopting new management formulas, for hospitals belonging to the 
SERMAS in the year 2009. We assess the relative hospitals’ efficiency by means of 
standard Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques and a DEA-bootstrap approach, 
followed by a second-stage consisting of a statistical analysis to assess differences in 
efficiency scores between the two groups by means of a Mann-Whitney U test and an 
analysis of DEA bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyze efficiency differences 
between traditionally managed hospitals and those ones operating under new management 
formulas in Madrid. Thus, this paper sheds new light on the current debate about the use of 
new forms of public hospitals’ management in Spain. One reason for this lack of empirical 
evidence may be the opacity of the Spanish NHS; although there is a considerable amount 
of information on Spanish hospitals in public databases, data is anonymized, making it 
difficult to identify hospitals and thus, to identify the management model. To overcome this 
                                                          
2 For an overview about the empirical evidence as regards the use of new management formulas in the 
Spanish NHS, see [14].
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problem, we crossed two different databases to extract individual hospital information (for 
a detailed explanation see the Data and Variables subsection).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section synthesizes the 
main NPM-style policies implemented in Spanish hospitals, with a particular focus on 
Madrid. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology used for inference. Section 4
reports the analysis results and interprets them. Section 5 concludes, summarizing our 
findings, their policy implications and possible directions for further research. 
2. New hospital management models
Though the Spanish public health system had contracted out some services to private 
hospitals for decades [15], the legislation passed during the second half of the 1990s
introduced new managerial formulas to govern publicly owned hospitals, significantly 
reshaping the healthcare landscape. At the central government level, Law 15/1997 was 
particularly important, since it enabled the implementation of a wide array of new hospital 
management models. Previously, during the first half of the 1990s, the ruling Socialist 
party had already passed legislation aimed at introducing more efficient and flexible 
organizational formulas, such as Law 30/1992, which regulated, among other things, the so-
called “consorcios” (consortia), and Law 30/1994, which first regulated the foundations 
model. When the conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular) gained power from 1996, it 
approved Royal Decree 10/19963, which allowed for the use of new hospital management 
models, with the explicit aim of “introducing more flexible organizational formulas, in 
order to meet the demands of efficiency and social profitability of public resources [sic]”. 
Most importantly, Law 15/1997 — the result of the parliamentary processing of Royal 
Decree 10/1996 — enabled at the national level the implementation of new managerial 
formulas to govern public hospitals, and also contemplated private sector involvement in 
the delivery and management of public healthcare services. With this, the entry of private 
providers into public healthcare delivery was facilitated further (for a comprehensive 
overview of the legislative framework behind the adoption of new hospital governance 
formulas in Spain, see Alvárez and Durán [16]).
                                                          
3 Royal Decree 10/1996 about new management formulas of the Spanish NHS.
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As a consequence of these changes to the legislative framework, the introduction of 
NPM-related policies to the public healthcare services increased across Spanish regions. By 
2002, when powers in healthcare management had been fully transferred to all Spanish 
regions, Madrid emerged as one of Spain’s most active sites of healthcare reform4. Here,
two main actions were taken as regards hospital management: (i) Introduction of market-
driven mechanisms through the separation of purchaser and provider, with the aim of 
transforming the public hospital network into a large number of smaller firms, with greater 
autonomy, their own legal status and, in competition with other hospitals, similar to the 
UK's hospital trusts [17] and, (ii) contracting out some or all hospital services, including 
clinic services. As a result, there are currently five different new management models in the 
SERMAS hospitals, including private or semi-private formulas, in addition to the so-called 
traditional direct management (ADM) model: public enterprises; foundations; PFI models 
with a public enterprise managing clinic services and outsourced non-clinic services to 
private companies; PPP models with full private management; and contracts with privately 
owned hospitals.
Table 1 summarizes the different management models coexisting in Madrid and 
their main characteristics. Briefly, ADM hospitals are directly managed by regional 
governments; they do not enjoy — usually — their own legal status and they are ruled by 
public law. In addition to this model, there are the so-called new management models
(NMM), including both forms of direct (public) and non-direct (private) service delivery. 
Within the first (direct management), we have public enterprises and foundations. They are 
configured as organizations with legal personality, ruled by private law and may be subject 
—if reflected in their statutes — to labor legislation to manage their staff, considered as key 
features to increase flexibility and autonomy [18]. Non-direct management formulas 
include contracting with private companies and different forms of PPP. As regards the first 
formula, healthcare contracting consists of an administrative contract whereby healthcare 
services are provided through privately owned facilities. Regarding the different forms of 
PPPs, in Madrid there are two models; the UK’s PFI model and an indigenous version, the 
so-called “Alzira” model.  PFI models involve long-term arrangements between the public 
                                                          
4 Through the implementation of Law on Health Organization of the Community of Madrid (LOSCAM-Law 
12/2001).
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and private sectors, whereby the private sector finances the hospital building and then 
delivers non-clinical services over a period of around 30 years [1,19]. The “Alzira” model 
is a PPP model which goes further, since the private sector finances, constructs and 
operates the physical hospital infrastructure, and also is in charge of clinical services 
delivery [1].  
[Insert table 1 around here]
In the Spanish context, the use of these new management models aimed to increase 
the efficiency of the health system. This would occur in two ways. Firstly, it would solve
the perceived problems caused by public law and statutory personnel regime [18]. Public 
law and civil servant statutory regime were considered two key obstacles to achieve 
efficiency gains, since it was believed that public law was too rigid to promote the system 
dynamism and statutory regime prevented to incorporate productivity and efficiency tools, 
such as performance related pay, into personnel management [20]. Secondly, the separation 
of purchaser and provider aimed to promote the creation of an internal market and the 
disaggregation of public sector units. It has been suggested that the separation purchaser / 
provider helps to improve efficiency, by introducing market incentives into the public 
healthcare sector management [21] and the introduction of contracts [22]. Moreover, 
disaggregation of public sector units is considered a fundamental tool to make former 
monolithic and over-bureaucratized organizations become more flexible, controllable and 
manageable by professional managers [9].
In addition, allowing the entry of private providers was supposed to have positive 
effects as regards efficiency improvements because of the relatively superior efficiency of 
the private sector over the public one, a view which justified much of the privatization 
movement [23]. A key argument when explaining the perceived superior efficiency of the 
private sector is the view that private firms may have more incentives to innovate because, 
unlike the public sector, innovations can generate benefits [24].
Based on these arguments, this paper will focus on the following research question: 
are new management formulas more efficient than traditional ones as regards hospital 
management? We turn now to the data and methodology of our study.
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3. Materials and methods
3.1. Methodology
When talking about public sector efficiency, and thus public healthcare efficiency, one may 
distinguish three dimensions of efficiency; allocative, distributive and productive or 
technical [9]. Clearly, a full-scale, comprehensive evaluation of the efficiency of new 
management formulas in the healthcare system would require evaluation of all three 
efficiency dimensions but, because of lack of reliable data, we focus only in one of those 
dimensions for which we have enough data; productive or technical efficiency. The concept 
of technical efficiency reflects the seminal notion of efficiency by Farrell [25]: Input 
oriented efficiency indicates the ability of each Decision Making Unit (DMU) (in our case 
hospitals) to minimize input consumption for a given level of output, while - alternatively –
output oriented efficiency indicates the ability of each DMU to maximize the output within 
a certain fixed level of inputs. In this paper, we propose to apply the DEA methodology
initially developed by Charnes et al. [26] — and extended by Banker [27] and Banker et al. 
[28] — to assess the relative technical efficiency of the sample of 25 hospitals belonging to 
the SERMAS. In the hospital sector, DEA methods have been the most common approach 
when measuring technical efficiency [29,30]
Briefly, the DEA methodology is an extension of linear programming which allows 
us to develop an efficient frontier for each DMU. The DEA estimation procedure consists 
of solving for each DMU an optimization problem via linear programming. The efficient 
frontier is represented by convex combinations of efficient DMUs. The rest of inefficient 
firms or DMUs are "wrapped" by the efficient frontier considering that deviations from the 
efficient frontier are due to technical inefficiency. One of the main advantages of DEA 
methodology is that it allows considering multiple inputs and outputs simultaneously, 
which makes it particularly attractive in the case of hospitals. Additionally, it requires no 
assumptions about the functional form of the production frontier, which reduces the 
theoretical needs when specifying the model [31].
The first question that arises when selecting the model is its orientation, in the sense 
that either the inputs or outputs are considered exogenous and beyond the control of 
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hospital management [32]. Following O'Neill et al. [33], hospital managers and 
policymakers have, in general, greater control over the level of inputs than output. O `Neill 
et al. [33] also argued that, in most countries, the emphasis is more on controlling costs 
rather than on  increasing demand of health services, which seems to be the case of Madrid. 
Based on these arguments we consider that an input orientation is the most suitable for our 
study. 
A second question of interest when formulating the model is the returns to scale 
assumption. In this paper, we assume Variable Returns to Scale (VRS), which seems
appropriate when we cannot assume that all DMUs are operating at an optimal scale [28]. 
Following Jacobs et al. [34] and Tiemann and Schreyögg [31], in the hospital sector issues 
such as imperfect competition, budgetary constraints and/or regulatory constraints may 
result in DMUs operating at an inefficient scale size, thus assuming constant returns to 
scale may be a strong assumption.
A third question to deal with is that DEA efficiency scores have been subject of 
criticism because of their lack of statistical basis [35]. Also, Simar and Wilson [36] proved 
that standard DEA estimates may be biased upwards. To overcome these problems, we 
employ the DEA homogeneous bootstrap methods described in Simar and Wilson [36,37]. 
Briefly, bootstrapping allows deriving statistical properties of efficiency scores through 
resampling, by estimating bias, variance and constructing confidence intervals [35].
Once we get the DEA efficiency scores for the SERMAS general hospitals, we 
analyze the differences in technical efficiency between traditional and new managed 
hospitals by means of two different methodologies; a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test 
and an analysis of bootstrapped average efficiency confidence intervals computed on the 
previous stage.
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3.2. Data and variables
The data used in this study was obtained from the Spanish Hospital Survey (ESRI)5 for the 
year 2009, and data provided by the Ministry of Health of the Community of Madrid6.
Because ESRI files are anonymized micro-data, we obtained hospital names by contrasting 
resources data from the ESRI with the Spanish National Catalogue of Hospitals7. We have 
considered only year 2009 because it was the first with fully available information for all 
PFI models.  This was also the last year available when writing this paper.
In 2009, there were 33 hospitals belonging to the SERMAS. From the initial sample 
of 33 hospitals, we excluded psychiatric, children, geriatrics and long stay hospitals, in 
order to work with a relatively homogeneous sample, which is crucial in a DEA analysis. 
The final sample consists of 25 public hospitals, including 14 operating under a traditional 
ADM model and 11 considered NMM.
As regards the variables employed, DEA models require a careful selection of 
inputs and outputs, so the selection of variables is another crucial step when implementing 
DEA methods. The selection of inputs and outputs has been conditioned by our sample 
size8, and variable selection was based on previous studies (see [33]). As inputs, we have 
used the number of beds, number of full-time employed physicians and the number of full-
time nursing staff. The number of beds is a proxy for hospital size and capital investment 
and has been the most widely used input in hospital efficiency studies. The number of 
physicians and nursing staff are proxies for hospitals’ labor and human capital.
As outputs, we have considered the number of discharges and the number of 
outpatient visits. However, in a production process not every output may be classified as 
desirable, and the inclusion of only desirable outputs may not reflect the true technical 
efficiency of a DMU. In the case of hospital efficiency, two clear examples of undesirable 
outputs are the death of a patient during treatment and readmission of patients, both outputs 
used in some studies as proxies for quality of outcome (see, for example, [32,39,40]). In 
this study, we have included in our model those two undesirable outputs; in-hospital 
                                                          
5 Retrieved from: http://www.msssi.gob.es/estadisticas/microdatos.do
6 Retrieved from: http://cmbd.sanidadmadrid.org/
7 Retrieved from: http://www.msssi.gob.es/estadisticas/microdatos.do
8 Following Cooper et al. [38] a rough “rule of thumb” is to keep the number of DMUs equal to or greater 
than }.
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mortality rate and the ratio between patient readmissions and discharges. Further, the four 
outputs (desirables and undesirables) are case-mix adjusted to control for complexity 
differences between hospitals, using hospitals’ average weights based upon the Diagnosis 
Related Group (DRG) system. A summary of variable definitions, measurement and 
descriptive statistics are provided as supplementary data in tables S1 and S2. Hospitals are 
grouped into ADM or NMM according to their management formula.
Modelling undesirable outputs has been object of considerable discussion in the 
efficiency literature (see supplementary data; Box 1). Because of the lack of consensus 
about the most appropriated approach to deal with undesirable factors, under strong 
disposability of undesirable outputs, we define seven different DEA models, by 
maintaining all inputs and desirable outputs fixed in all models, and combining different 
approaches to deal with undesirable outputs and the number of undesirable outputs9. Table 
2 reports the seven different models.
[Insert table 2 around here]
4. Results and discussion
Table 3 shows results for the standard and bootstrapped DEA models10. For each model the 
first column shows the estimates of the relative efficiency scores without bias correction for 
each hospital (βi), while the second column shows bootstrap bias-corrected efficiency 
scores estimates (bias βi). Table S3 (provided as supplementary data) reports estimated 
standard deviations for each hospital ( . Following Simar and Wilson [37], bias-correction 
should not be used unless , i.e., when the bias-corrected estimator has a 
lower mean square error than the ordinary or standard estimate. We checked this: column
two in Table S3 shows the ratio =  and columns three and four report 
the estimated 95% confidence intervals. Our results show that the “mean square error test” 
is consistently passed, so we discuss only bias-corrected results.
                                                          
9 Including in our model 3 inputs and 4 outputs may be too close to the so-called “rule of thumb”, so we 
defined also alternative models ignoring undesirable outputs or including just one.
10 DEA models computed with the FEAR package developed by Wilson [41]. Bootstrapped efficiency scores 
obtained through 10000 replications.
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A first look at the results does not reveal any clear pattern regarding the existence of 
a relationship between new management formulas and improved technical efficiency; in all 
the models analyzed we found among the “top three” efficient hospitals both ADM and 
NMM hospitals. On average, and considering only models including undesirable outputs, 
the most efficient units are hospitals (DMUs) 17, 20 and 5. DMU 17 is a PFI model with a 
public enterprise managing clinic services and outsourced non-clinic services while DMUs 
20 and 5 are ADM hospitals. The same applies for the less efficient units; on average the 
less efficient units are DMUs 12, 4 and 15. DMUs 12 and 4 are ADM hospitals while DMU 
15 is a PFI model similar to DMU 17. Interestingly, our results suggest that the two 
hospitals characterized by full private management of clinic and non-clinic services —
DMUs 6 and 22 — are not in any of the estimated models among the “top three” efficient 
hospitals, which may cast some doubt on the often-repeated superiority of the private sector 
over the public in terms of efficiency. 
[Insert table 3 around here]
Table 4 compares the average scores of ADM hospitals with NMM hospitals. The 
average efficiency scores show a slightly better performance of NMM hospitals for the 
seven models defined, but that difference does not seem to be statistically significant 
anyway. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that both populations are the same when 
performing the Mann-Whitney test in all models. Moreover, average bootstrapped 
confidence intervals for the efficiency of the two groups under analysis overlap to a large 
degree11, thus we do not have evidence that the two groups are significantly different as 
regards technical efficiency. Interestingly, a closer look at Table S2 (descriptive statistics) 
indicates that NMM hospitals are much smaller and homogeneous than their ADM 
counterparts, thus, in principle, more manageable and controllable but, this important 
feature does not seem to make NMM hospitals more efficient than their ADM counterparts.
                                                          
11 Efficiency confidence intervals computed with the FEAR package developed by Wilson [41]. Individual 
confidence intervals are reported in Table S3 (provided as supplementary data).
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[Insert table 4 around here]
In sum, the results of all seven DEA-bootstrap models and all statistical analysis 
comparing both groups of hospitals do not reveal any statistical significant different in 
efficiency between traditionally managed hospitals and those using new management 
formulas. The fact that we find different management models (both ADM and NMM) 
among hospitals with higher — and lower — efficiency scores may suggest that what really 
matters is the individual hospital management, not the management model itself.
What policy lessons can be extracted from our findings? Firstly, the finding that 
new hospital management models do not seem to be necessarily better or worse - in terms 
of technical efficiency - than traditional management models, may help to support the view 
that it is more worthwhile to focus on improving the good governance of public health 
services as a whole, rather than simply focusing on switching management model [6].
Secondly, due to the potential lack of efficiency gains derived from the 
implementation of NPM-related policies in Madrid’s public hospitals, a number of 
undesirable problems may emerge, adding more uncertainty to the decision-making 
process, particularly as regards the implementation of those managerial formulas involving 
the private sector, such as different forms of PPPs. In this regard, the theory of incomplete 
contracts advanced by Hart et al.[42] suggests that if a private firm does not generate 
profits by improving efficiency, profit maximization incentives may have a downward 
effect on service quality, especially when service quality is difficult to measure. Moreover, 
in a non-efficiency gains scenario, private firms may have significant incentives to raise the 
prices charged to governments when renegotiating contracts (the so-called “hold up” 
effect12) and/or contracts may become, financially speaking, unviable, leading to 
government bailouts. This is already happening: first, in 2010, the PFI hospitals from 
Madrid requested a government bailout [14]. Next, in 2011, El País [44] published a letter 
addressed to the Madrid’s health commissioner, in which the private firms operating the 
seven PFI hospitals from Madrid attempted to renegotiate their contracts, warning of the 
                                                          
12 When contracts are highly complex or incomplete, governments may need to renegotiate the contract in the 
case of an unforeseen problem or event. This not only has costs, it also gives the private firm – with its 
incentives to maximize profits – to raise the prices charged to governments [43].
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collapse of all seven PFI hospitals due to unforeseen events, such as the application of a 
new Accountability Plan in 2011. 
Finally, though we have presented efficiency estimates for the sample of Madrid 
hospitals and health policy implications, these results must be interpreted with caution in 
view of some limitations of this study such as sample size and data limitations. Small 
sample size prevented us from including additional input and output measures which may 
better reflect the true hospital production process. In addition, the cross-section nature of 
the data does not permit us to analyze efficiency changes over time which may of interest 
when analyzing healthcare reform effects.
5. Conclusions
As a consequence of rising healthcare expenditures and the ongoing economic 
crisis, the issue of public healthcare sector efficiency is once again at the top of the policy 
agenda across many regional governments in Spain. Despite of the lack of conclusive 
empirical evidence, the adoption of NPM-related policies in healthcare management is still 
on the rise, particularly in regions such as Madrid, which underwent deep reform of its 
public healthcare services from the 2000s.
This paper sought to assess whether the use of new managerial tools led to 
improvements in technical efficiency for a sample of 25 hospitals belonging to the 
SERMAS. Our results suggest that there is no difference in terms of technical efficiency 
between traditionally managed hospitals and those adopting new management formulas 
and, there are always different management models among the more — and less —
efficient hospitals. These findings remained unchanged when using different DEA models 
and different statistics analysis, calling into question if what actually matters is the 
management model or, on the contrary, particular managers’ practices. Moreover, our 
results suggest that there is no clear evidence to support the idea that the public sector is 
inherently less efficient than the private in this case/sector.
This absence of evidence about efficiency gains derived from implementing new 
management formulas in Madrid hospitals, along with the scarcity of additional empirical 
evidence on this topic in Spain, may open the door to other considerations which could be 
the object of future research; which/what are the real drivers of healthcare reforms in 
Page 15 of 24
Ac
ce
pt
ed
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
15
Madrid? Is healthcare reform motivated ideologically, by politicians who believe that 
NPM-related mechanisms will bring about better solutions for patients? The conservative 
Madrid’s regional government has been characterized since the 2000s by a strong NPM 
vocation [12], which may have influenced its adoption of marketization policies in the 
SERMAS. Or is healthcare reform explained by “regulatory capture”? Laffont and Tirole
[45] showed that regulators — in our context policymakers — may be “captured” or 
influenced by interest groups hoping for future employment within the regulated firms, an 
effect known as the “revolving door”. To date, evidence is emerging about “revolving 
doors” in the SERMAS [46]. Though movements between the private and public sector are 
not necessarily harmful, and indeed, may be beneficial, when done in a transparent way 
without conflict of interest, they may have negative consequences, in terms of social 
welfare, if policies are motivated by the hope of future personal gains instead of the 
optimum outcome for the general interest [47].
Next steps for future research include overcoming some of the limitations of this 
study by using additional data on more years as soon as this is available; and to answer 
some of the questions raised by this research, such as identifying the drivers of healthcare 
reform implementation in Spain. Research evaluating healthcare policy in Spain would be 
considerably facilitated if data on the Spanish NHS was rendered more transparent.
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Highlights: 
We deploy a bootstrapped DEA to compare hospitals’ governance models in Madrid 
We do not find evidence that new management formulas are more — or less — efficient  
Results suggest that what matters is the management itself not the management model 
*Highlights (for review)
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Table 1. Main characteristics of SERMAS hospitals 
 
Type of model Name Service 
delivery 
Legal 
subjection 
Staff management 
Administrative Direct 
Management 
Clinic unit with no legal 
status (traditional managed 
hospital) 
Public 
(direct) 
Public Law Statutory regime 
New Management Model Public Enterprise Public 
(direct) 
Private law Labor legislation** 
New Management Model Foundation Public 
(direct) 
Private law Labor legislation 
New Management Model Contracting Private 
(indirect) 
Private law Labor legislation 
New Management Model PFI Mixed* 
(indirect) 
Private law Labor legislation 
New Management Model “Alzira” model Private 
(indirect) 
Private law Labor legislation 
Notes: *Private sector delivers non-clinic services while public sector delivers clinic services through a public enterprise. 
**Subject to labor legislation except if reflected on its statutes subjection to statutory regime 
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Table 2. Different DEA models 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Inputs 
       Beds x x x x x x x 
Doctors x x x x x x x 
Nursing x x x x x x x 
Outputs 
       Discharges x x x x x x x 
Outpatients x x x x x x x 
Undesirable Outputs 
      Mortality Rate 
 
x x 
  
x x 
Readmission rate 
   
x x x x 
 
Notes: Model 1 ignores undesirable outputs. Models 2, 4 and 6 treat undesirable outputs as normal inputs. 
Models 3, 5 and 7 use a linear transformation to deal with undesirable outputs. 
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Table 3. DEA efficiency scores 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
DMU βi bias βi βi bias βi βi bias βi βi bias βi βi bias βi βi bias βi βi bias βi 
1(a) 0.8657 0.7940 0.8657 0.8084 0.8657 0.8037 0.8657 0.8022 0.8657 0.7983 0.8657 0.8114 0.8657 0.8043 
2(a) 0.7711 0.7027 0.8599 0.8011 0.7893 0.7183 0.7849 0.7150 0.7711 0.7049 0.8599 0.8022 0.7893 0.7190 
3(a) 1.0000 0.8950 1.0000 0.9143 1.0000 0.9046 1.0000 0.9051 1.0000 0.8993 1.0000 0.9166 1.0000 0.9061 
4(a) 0.7576 0.6949 0.7648 0.7049 0.7576 0.6998 0.7620 0.7014 0.7576 0.6990 0.7656 0.7067 0.7576 0.6994 
5(a) 1.0000 0.9246 1.0000 0.9340 1.0000 0.9282 1.0000 0.9287 1.0000 0.9100 1.0000 0.9344 1.0000 0.9143 
6(b) 1.0000 0.8951 1.0000 0.9142 1.0000 0.9058 1.0000 0.9038 1.0000 0.9002 1.0000 0.9168 1.0000 0.9061 
7(a) 0.9479 0.9131 0.9500 0.9080 0.9498 0.9018 0.9479 0.9110 0.9479 0.9131 0.9500 0.9072 0.9498 0.9020 
8(c) 0.9081 0.8504 0.9088 0.8608 0.9085 0.8571 0.9118 0.8582 0.9081 0.8516 0.9119 0.8648 0.9085 0.8556 
9(a) 0.8269 0.7812 0.8280 0.7890 0.8271 0.7849 0.8296 0.7831 0.8269 0.7831 0.8296 0.7866 0.8271 0.7844 
10(a) 0.8353 0.7720 0.8361 0.7845 0.8353 0.7783 0.8841 0.8191 0.8488 0.7810 0.8841 0.8271 0.8488 0.7855 
11(d) 1.0000 0.9135 1.0000 0.9270 1.0000 0.9192 1.0000 0.9205 1.0000 0.9175 1.0000 0.9287 1.0000 0.9200 
12(a) 0.7232 0.6871 0.7628 0.7109 0.7259 0.6774 0.7316 0.6911 0.7232 0.6864 0.7646 0.7130 0.7259 0.6771 
13(a) 0.8543 0.7860 0.8804 0.8253 0.8648 0.8006 0.8543 0.7880 0.8543 0.7872 0.8804 0.8256 0.8648 0.8005 
14(e) 0.8942 0.8507 0.9091 0.8633 0.9060 0.8568 0.8964 0.8510 0.8942 0.8505 0.9130 0.8684 0.9060 0.8563 
15(c) 0.7612 0.6907 0.8063 0.7435 0.7836 0.7190 0.7937 0.7219 0.7710 0.7001 0.8063 0.7442 0.7836 0.7176 
16(c) 0.9420 0.8906 1.0000 0.9446 1.0000 0.9246 0.9555 0.9097 0.9458 0.8942 1.0000 0.9450 1.0000 0.9246 
17(c) 0.9912 0.9547 1.0000 0.9304 1.0000 0.9207 0.9912 0.9530 0.9912 0.9537 1.0000 0.9318 1.0000 0.9206 
18(c) 0.8974 0.8398 0.9545 0.9075 0.9456 0.8907 0.8991 0.8427 0.8974 0.8397 0.9545 0.9086 0.9456 0.8911 
19(a) 0.8763 0.8180 1.0000 0.9382 1.0000 0.9285 1.0000 0.9117 1.0000 0.8992 1.0000 0.9216 1.0000 0.9050 
20(a) 0.9196 0.8490 1.0000 0.9457 1.0000 0.9370 1.0000 0.9282 1.0000 0.9187 1.0000 0.9359 1.0000 0.9244 
21(c) 0.9017 0.8353 0.9683 0.9226 0.9623 0.9078 0.9291 0.8768 0.9138 0.8542 0.9683 0.9245 0.9623 0.9080 
22(f) 1.0000 0.8951 1.0000 0.9147 1.0000 0.9054 1.0000 0.9062 1.0000 0.9002 1.0000 0.9162 1.0000 0.9047 
23(a) 1.0000 0.9117 1.0000 0.9145 1.0000 0.9046 1.0000 0.9040 1.0000 0.8986 1.0000 0.9180 1.0000 0.9052 
24(c) 0.8978 0.8246 0.9396 0.8856 0.9251 0.8623 0.9099 0.8461 0.8978 0.8288 0.9396 0.8878 0.9251 0.8625 
25(a) 1.0000 0.8950 1.0000 0.9157 1.0000 0.9045 1.0000 0.9047 1.0000 0.8997 1.0000 0.9167 1.0000 0.9044 
Notes: (a) ADM model; (b) contracted private hospital; (c) PFI model; (d) Foundation; (e) Public enterprise; (f) PPP — “Alzira” model
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Table 4. Average bootstrap-DEA confidence intervals and Mann-Whitney tests 
 
  Mean Score 95 % bootstrapped C.I. U test
a 
Model 1 ADM .8160214 .7671357 .8804786 -1.314 (.189) 
 NMM .8582273 .8052545 .9227273  
Model 2 ADM .8496071 .7948 .9077714 -.931 (.352) 
 NMM .8922 .8340818 .9503182  
Model 3 ADM .8337286 .7776071 .8978286 -.1095 (.273) 
 NMM .8790364 .8162364 .9448182  
Model 4 ADM .8352357 .7804571 .9010429 -.766 (.443) 
 NMM .8718091 .8169818 .9317273  
Model 5 ADM .8270357 .7683286 .8962429 -.876 (.381) 
 NMM .8627909 .8078909 .9254364  
Model 6 ADM .8516429 .7957929 .9115143 -1.204 (.228) 
 NMM .8942545 .8363182 .9509727  
Model 7 ADM .8308286 .7696429 .8988143 -1.396 (.163) 
 NMM .8788273 .8165364 .9449091  
Note: a Z values for Mann-Whitney test. Test significance in parenthesis. 
 
 
